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THE PHENOMENON OF SUBSTITUTION AND THE STATUTE QUIA 
EMPTORES* 
RONALD BENTON BROWN** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Law students generally think that American property law is a confusing 
mix of unconnected, inconsistent and nearly incomprehensible rules.  In fact, 
an overview of property law reveals a recurring pattern.  In numerous 
situations, a successor in title takes the place of his or her predecessor 
regarding rights and responsibilities that are related to ownership of that land.  
That process is called substitution because the successor is substituted for the 
predecessor regarding those rights and responsibilities.  But sometimes 
substitution happens automatically and other times it happens only if that is the 
parties’ intent.  Automatic substitution seems to follow the pattern established 
by the ancient Statute of Quia Emptores.  Property students would benefit if 
substitution was taught as a singular concept that explains the connection 
between the various examples and statutes in Property that concern 
substitution. 
II.  EXAMPLES OF AUTOMATIC SUBSTITUTION 
A. Covenants Running with the Land 
A covenant running with the land is a promise that can be enforced by or 
against a person who was not a party to it.  The person’s only connection to the 
covenant is the acquisition of land to which the covenant relates.  Why should 
acquisition of that land involve this person?  Casebooks give extensive 
coverage to answering that question.1  The third-party beneficiary doctrine 
 
* © Ronald Benton Brown. 
** Professor of law. Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida. 
  The author would like to thank Professors Joseph Grohman, George Lefcoe and Elena 
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 1. See generally CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP 
AND USE 700-91 (4th ed. 1997); JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW 392-448 (4th ed. 1999); BARLOW BURKE ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS 
OF PROPERTY LAW 757-74 (1999); A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT 
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might have been borrowed from contract law to provide an answer, but it did 
not exist when covenants running with the land evolved based on the concept 
of substitution.  The transferee is substituted for the original party in the 
contractual relationship due to his acquisition of that land.  That puts the 
transferee into privity of estate with the other party to the covenant, a 
relationship that is close enough to include the right of enforcement or the 
obligation of performance. 
The majority of the discussion of covenants running with the land focuses 
on use covenants.  However, property courses also cover title covenants 
typically found in deeds,2 and often included in leases.  The critical question is 
usually whether a remote successor can recover from a remote transferor based 
on the title covenants found in a deed way back in the chain of title.  The 
successor claims to be substituted for the covenantee/grantee enabling him to 
recover on a promise that was not made to him. 
B. Servitudes 
A successor to the fee title takes title subject to any outstanding equities, if 
the successor knew or should have known about them before taking title.  In 
other words, the successor is substituted for the party whose conduct gave rise 
to the equity unless the successor is protected by his status as a bona fide 
purchaser for value.  Nearly every student is familiar with the origin of 
servitudes from the landmark case of Tulk v. Moxhay.3  It established equitable 
servitudes as a species of burden that would afflict the transferee of land based 
upon the conduct of his predecessor.4 
Because the court revealed little of its reasoning process, the case presents 
a mystery to many students.  Tulk started off with the premise that the buyer of 
 
ON PROPERTY 937-1078 (4th ed. 2000); EDWARD E. CHASE, PROPERTY LAW: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 842-916 (2002); JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 595-663 (7th ed. 1996); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 857-919 
(4th ed. 1998); SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 633-720 (2d ed. 1998); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENCAMP, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 584-714 (3d ed. 1999); EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., 
FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 427-73 (4th ed. 2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 343-523 (2d ed. 1997). 
 2. See BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 1275; BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 614-
26; BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 553-57; CASNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 759-71; CHASE, 
supra note 1, at 706-17, 759-71; CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 1, at 1246-69; DUKEMINIER & 
KRIER, supra note 1, at 600-21; JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 469-75; KURTZ & 
HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 1116-23; GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 
557-687 (1996); RABIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1019-34; SINGER, supra note 1, at 941-43. 
 3. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Eng. Chancery 1848), construed in BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 
426; BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 758; CHASE, supra note 1, at 853; CRIBBET ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 613; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 863. 
 4. Tulk, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1144. 
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land, who knew that he was getting the land at a low price because the seller 
thought it was subject to a burden that it be used only as a park, could not 
escape the burden of that promise in order to buy the surrounding lots.5  The 
promisor could not get that windfall because it would amount to unjust 
enrichment.  Thus, an equity was created when the original promisor made the 
promise.  Of course, equity should force him to perform as he promised in an 
inducement to buying one of the surrounding lots.6  But the action was not 
brought against the promisor.  It was brought against a remote successor in 
title, someone who had acquired the title which the promisor had once owned.7  
Should he be burdened?  Yes, reasoned the court, even though the covenant 
could not run with the land under the law of England at that time.  An equity 
had attached and he was the successor.8  Once again we see substitution at 
work. 
The result would not be different under the new Restatement,9 which 
actually expands the class of obligations considered servitudes.10  The 
Restatement should also make substitution a more pervasive phenomenon by 
allowing it to occur with respect to servitudes regardless of whether the burden 
or benefit touches and concerns the land.11 
C. Liens 
Equitable liens12 arise by equitable conversion.  When the land is 
subsequently transferred, the transferee is substituted for the party who agreed 
to the lien.  Thus, the transferee takes title subject to the mortgage lien and the 
mortgage lienor can foreclose on the lien if the obligation the mortgage secures 
goes into default.  Liens created by statute are modern creations that follow the 
pattern, by legislative fiat, of binding successors.  Examples are judgment liens 
and mechanics’ liens. 
Note that the substitution is traditionally limited to the obligation relating 
to the title.  Substitution does not automatically apply to bind the successor to 
the obligation that was secured by the lien.  If the successor agrees to be bound 
by that obligation,13 he is bound by a process that is technically assuming the 
obligation, but which is generally known as “assuming the mortgage.”  
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) PROPERTY (1997) (generally referred 
to as the Restatement of Servitudes). 
 10. See generally id. § 1.1. 
 11. See generally id. § 3.2. 
 12. Equitable liens include vendor’s liens and mortgage liens in a lien theory jurisdiction. 
 13. The obligation is generally the promise to repay money borrowed plus interest 
memorialized in a promissory note. 
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Substitution does not apply, it appears, because the promise to repay the 
principal and interest does not touch and concern the land.  Thus we draw the 
distinction between taking subject to the mortgage and assuming the mortgage.  
Today’s property casebooks generally introduce mortgages14 and illustrate the 
distinction between taking subject to and assuming a mortgage,15 but they 
otherwise ignore liens.16 
D. Voidable Title 
Where title has been acquired by fraud or misrepresentation in the 
inducement,17 the victim can bring an action in equity for rescission.18  In the 
distant past, a judgment of rescission was a personal judgment ordering the 
current owner to re-convey or be held in contempt.  Now, however, a judgment 
of rescission will effect the transfer of title back to the transferor.  The law 
indicates that the title is subject to rescission by calling it a “voidable title” and 
distinguishes  voidable title from a void title which is a nullity.19 
But what happens when the voidable title is transferred?  To illustrate the 
problem, let us start with A as the owner of the land.  A was the victim of fraud 
in the inducement.  B induced A to convey the land to him by fraud.  Thus B’s 
title is voidable.  A could bring an action in equity for rescission against B and 
win, but A does not act quickly enough and consequently, B transfers the land 
to C.  Is C’s title voidable?  It is if A could get rescission against C.  How 
could A prevail against C if C did not commit the fraud?  The only way is if C 
is substituted for B.  And that was the traditional result.  A could prevail 
against C unless C had an equitable defense.  After all, rescission is an action 
in equity.  If C was a bona fide purchaser for value, then A could not establish 
that the equities would balance in A’s favor, so A would not prevail. 
 
 14. BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 1204-55; BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 498-
516; CASNER & LEACH, supra note 1, at 771-82; CHASE, supra note 1, at 302-03; CRIBBET ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 1001-06; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 632-49; JOHNSON ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 593-632; KURTZ & HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 1068-73; NELSON ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 867-84; RABIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 985-1017; SINGER, supra note 1, at 961-
69. 
 15. See BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 1204-55; BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 
515-16; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 643-44; NELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 867-84. 
 16. But see CASNER & LEACH, supra note 1, at 775. 
 17. This is distinguished from fraud in the factum which would render the title void because 
of the lack of at least one of the requisites for transferring title. 
 18. Creditors also have a cause of action for rescission when the transfer was in fraud of the 
creditors. 
 19. See Beth Kaler, An Overview of Void and Voidable Title, 29 THE FUND CONCEPT 149 
(Att’ys Title Ins. Fund) Oct. 1997. 
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The concept of voidable title is raised in some property casebooks;20 but 
the discussion is brief.  Texts for real estate transactions courses do not seem to 
provide coverage either.  Perhaps property teachers are counting on the topic 
being covered in sales courses, but that may be wishful thinking.  It is 
important to any lawyer dealing with land titles and should not be missed by 
property students. 
E. Shelter 
A person may take title free of an adverse claim or interest based on the 
protection of a recording act, the operation of equitable estoppel or other 
equitable principle.  However, what happens when that land is transferred to a 
person who cannot satisfy the same requirements for protection?  For example, 
let us start with A as the owner of land.  A was induced to transfer title by B’s 
fraud.  B, as we discussed in the prior section, would get voidable title.  If B 
transferred title to a bona fide purchaser (BFP), a good faith purchaser for 
value, and without notice, BFP’s title would not be voidable.  However, if BFP 
later gave the land to D as a gift, the situation would be different.  D did not 
pay value for the land, so D is not a bona fide purchaser for value.  The logic 
behind equity’s protection of a bona fide purchase would not apply to protect 
D.  Logically, A should be able to get rescission against D because D would 
not be harmed.  After all, D started out with nothing, so he will not be in a 
worse position if he ends up with nothing.  However, substitution would now 
save D.  Since D acquired BFP’s land, D is substituted for BFP and can raise 
any defense against A that BFP could have raised.21  We may describe that by 
saying that D is sheltered22 by the protections that apply to BFP who was his 
predecessor in title.  In other words, D’s title was improved by going through a 
“bfp filter.”23  There is, however, a limit to the application of the shelter 
 
 20. See BERGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 547; BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 112; CHASE, 
supra note 1; CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 1, at 151; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 1, at 153.  
These textbooks use O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980), as a principal case.  While its 
primary focus is adverse possession, it also introduces the concept of void and voidable title to 
personal property in the context of UCC § 2-403.  O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 867-68. 
 21. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1952); RUFFORD G. PATTON AND CARROLL G. PATTON, 1 PATTON ON LAND 
TITLES § 15 (1957); 8 THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 
4315 (1963). 
 22. See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 340 (3d. ed. 1998).  The term 
“shelter” is not widely used in real estate law to describe this phenomenon although it is used in 
this text.  See generally ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24.02 (1985).  Shelter is a term that is used in commercial law. 
 23. See BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 626-32; NELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 993; GRANT 
S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, 
FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 228-29 (5th ed. 1998).  These texts use the term “bfp filter.” 
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doctrine: if B, the wrongdoer, reacquires the land, he will not be able to claim 
shelter under BFP’s title because B is the one who committed the fraud. 
If protection was claimed under a notice or race-notice recording act, the 
result should be the same.  These recording acts protect a subsequent bona fide 
purchaser for value from a claim based on an unrecorded instrument.  Let us 
take the following example: X owned land.  Subsequently, X conveyed the 
land to Y, but Y failed to record.  X later conveyed the very same land to BFP, 
a bona fide purchaser for value who acquired the land without notice of X’s 
prior conveyance to Y.  What would happen if BFP gave the land to Z?  As a 
donee, Z is not a bona fide purchaser who is protected by the recording act.  
However, due to the shelter doctrine, Z would be able to claim the same 
protection for his title that Y could have claimed.  Viewed alone, this might be 
attributed to courts interpreting a statute, or more rightly, to putting a judicial 
gloss on the statute in order to accomplish the legislative intent.  But in context 
we can see that Z is substituted for his grantor Y because he is the transferee of 
Z’s title.  That this substitution is justified by the policy of effectuating the 
legislative intent does not make it any less an example of substitution. 
The recording acts are covered in all first year property casebooks,24 but 
few of them address shelter.25  Only students who take an advanced real estate 
transactions course are likely to encounter it in a real estate context.26  Shelter 
would seem to be a logical topic to cover in completing the discussion of title 
assurance.  It is a concept that students will need in commercial law or real 
estate practice and it is not difficult to understand if presented as another 
example of substitution. 
F. Tacking in Adverse Possession 
Adverse possession is a common topic for the first-year course in 
property.27  The traditional doctrine provides that a person who possesses land 
 
 24. See BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 597-652; CASNER & LEACH, supra note 1, at 783-
814; CHASE, supra note 1, at 682-98; CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 1, at 1169-1228; DUKEMINIER 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 651-710; KURTZ & HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 1126-50; JOHNSON ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 475-516; NELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 972-1004; RABIN ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 1035-72; SINGER, supra note 1, at 943-59. 
 25. But see BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 626-32; NELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 993.  
See also JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 491 n.1 (mentioning shelter, but without any 
explanation). 
 26. LEFCOE, supra note 1, at 340; NELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 228-29. 
 27. See BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 499-560; BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 
563-85; BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 129-43; CASNER & LEACH, supra note 1, at 111-49; 
CHASE, supra note 1, at 57-123; CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 1, at 148-66; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, 
supra note 1, at 117-68; PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 24-60 (1984).  Shelter is also 
mentioned in first-year textbooks.  See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 44-68; KURTZ & 
HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 174-225; SINGER, supra note 1, at 135-69; NELSON ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 77-114. 
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he does not own may acquire title to it by satisfying certain requirements.  The 
entry into possession of the land must be hostile to the owner’s title, open and 
notorious, exclusive and under color of title; and that possession must be 
continuous for the statutory period. 
What happens if the person who has taken possession of land in such a 
way that the time has begun to run transfers the land to another?  Does the 
transferee have to begin the adverse possessing all over again?  That was the 
traditional rule applied to adverse possession of personal property; but in real 
property the transferee was allowed to continue his predecessor’s period of 
adverse possession.  This was referred to as tacking periods of possession.  In 
other words, the transferee is substituted for his transferor in regard to the 
adverse possession his predecessor began. 
Howard v. Kunto28 is used to illustrate tacking29 because it presents an 
interesting wrinkle.  Due to a surveying error, the transferor was not in 
possession of the lot described in the deed the transferor delivered to the 
transferee.  He was actually in possession of the neighboring lot.  The 
transferee did get possession of the house he thought he was buying, but his 
transferor did not own that house and his deed did not describe that house.  The 
transferee tried to solve his dilemma by claiming title to the house by adverse 
possession.  If he tacked his period of possession onto the period of possession 
of his predecessor, he would have title by adverse possession.  However, his 
adversary claimed he could not tack periods because he was not in privity with 
his transferor.  The deed described the neighboring lot, so it had nothing to do 
with the lot whose title he was claiming by adverse possession; how could the 
conveyance of nothing effect a substitution?  The court struggled to come up 
with an explanation of why tacking should be allowed.  It concluded that the 
adverse possessor did transfer possession, regardless of what the deed said.  
Possession does provide rights to the land.  The court reasoned that the transfer 
of possession was sufficient to justify tacking.30  In essence, the transfer of 
possession is sufficient to justify substitution of the transferee for the transferor 
for purposes of continuing the adverse possession.  The critical factor was that 
some interest in land had been transferred so substitution occurred. 
It is interesting to note that traditionally tacking was not allowed for the 
adverse possession of personal property.31  Each new possession was treated as 
a new conversion of the property that also started the limitations period 
 
 28. 477 P.2d 210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970). 
 29. CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 1, at 1320; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 143. 
 30. The same point is made in Carpenter v. Huffman, 314 So. 2d 65 (Ala. 1975), used as a 
principal case in BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 569. 
 31. This, inter alia, is revealed in O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980), construed 
in BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 547; CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 1, at 151; 
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 153; KURTZ & HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 220 n.1; 
SINGER, supra note 1, at 179. 
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running again.  That might be explained by the fact that adverse possession 
was a real property doctrine that was expanded to include personal property 
and that the expansion had not included all of the adverse possession doctrine. 
G. Lis Pendens 
The doctrine of lis pendens is rarely explained in property casebooks,32 but 
it is a common topic in real estate transactions books.33  Under the doctrine, 
once litigation has commenced concerning the title to land, the transfer of the 
land subjects the transferee to the outcome of the litigation.  Thus, if A brings a 
suit against B to quiet title to certain land, and B conveys the land to C, C’s 
title is subject to the outcome of A’s litigation against B.  By acquiring B’s 
interest, C is substituted for B as far as the outcome of the litigation goes.  So if 
A wins, A’s title is quieted against not only B, but also against C.  Thus, by 
accepting title, C is substituted for B in the outcome of the litigation. 
Of course, what makes the application of this doctrine so interesting and 
challenging is how it intersects with recording.  Typically, the recording of a 
notice of lis pendens is required to invoke the doctrine in a case.  Therefore, if 
A did not record a notice of lis pendens as required by statute, C may be 
protected by the recording act.  In addition, C may be able to invoke the 
protection of equity if he can establish the elements of estoppel, meaning, good 
faith detrimental reliance on some act, or failure to act despite a duty to act, 
against A.  Procedural due process may also provide C with a defense if C did 
not get notice and an opportunity to defend his title. 
III.  WHEN AUTOMATIC SUBSTITUTION DOES NOT OCCUR 
A. Easements 
An easement is created by the transfer, voluntary or not, of a 
nonpossessory interest in the land.  Property casebooks generally provide 
extensive coverage of easements.34  No examples have been found where the 
recipient of an easement is substituted for the transferor. 
 
 32. See, e.g., BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 618-19.  Lis pendens may be mentioned, 
without explanation in the context of the discussion of recording acts.  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & 
KRIER, supra note 1, at 652, 655 n.1. 
 33. See, e.g., LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 298-303; ROBIN MALLOY & JAMES SMITH, REAL 
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 316-18 (1998); NELSON & 
WHITMAN, supra note 23, at 595-600. 
 34. See, e.g., BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 705-44; CASNER & LEACH, supra note 1, at 
937-1078; CHASE, supra note 1 at 745-840; CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 1, at 523-95; 
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 780-857; KURTZ & HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 584-
686; JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 633-730; NELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 688-771; RABIN 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 355-473; SINGER, supra note 1, at 285-323, 395-433. 
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However, the fact that the recipient of an easement is not substituted for 
the grantor does explain one of the oddities of property law, the grant-re-grant 
theory of easement by reservation.  If A wanted to convey land to B but keep 
an easement, it would seem logical for A to simply convey the title except for 
the easement that A intended to keep, but that is not how things work under the 
common law.  The traditional rule was that A would convey his entire title to B 
and B would grant back an easement to A, hence grant and re-grant.  This 
might be explained by the avarice of medieval lawyers who chose to employ 
two documents to do what could be accomplished by one because that would 
enable them to charge more.  But that would not explain why the theory 
continued even after two documents were no longer used because the grant-re-
grant became an irrebuttable legal fiction. 
Substitution provides a logical answer.  If A was conveying the land, A 
would want to escape all the burdens associated with owning that land.  That 
would be accomplished if B was completely substituted for A.  If A did not 
convey all his title, A would still have some responsibility.  If A wanted to 
have B substituted for all the burdens, then A would have to completely divest 
himself of the entire title.  Conveying the easement back to A would not cause 
a substitution because A had only received an easement.  Thus the term 
“reservation” to indicate an easement that the grantor had retained by the 
process of this grant and re-grant in contrast to merely an “exception” of the 
easement from the title being conveyed. 
Grant-re-grant theory had significance when it came to interpreting the 
terms of the easement and in justifying the rule that an easement could not be 
reserved in favor of a third party, but that rule has been under attack for ages.35  
Once an important part of the discussion of easement creation, it may not even 
be mentioned in a modern property casebook.  If discussed at all,36 coverage is 
minimal and generally limited to the rule prohibiting the reservation of an 
easement in a third party.37 
B. Leases 
Substitution does not occur when a landlord leases land to a tenant.  The 
essence of a lease is that the landlord has a continuing interest in the land 
despite having leased the land to the tenant.  The tenant may have the right to 
present possession, but the landlord has more than a future interest.  During the 
 
 35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 472 cmt. b (1944). 
 36. Courts have been inhospitable to such technical requirements which are seen as medieval 
in nature and likely to thwart the intent of the parties.  The Third Restatement of Servitudes 
rejects such technicalities.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.6(2) (1998). 
 37. See, e.g., BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 330; BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 706-07; 
CRIBBET ET AL., supra  note 1, at 529-34; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 783-89; KURTZ 
& HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 586-92; NELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 694-95; RABIN ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 376-77; SINGER, supra note 1, at 410-11. 
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term of the lease, the landlord is involved in a relationship with the tenant that 
is defined by doctrine and history, as well as by modern statutes.  The study of 
leases seems to constitute a significant part of first-year Property based on the 
casebook coverages.38 
C. Subleases 
The term sublease is used in distinction to an assignment of a lease 
interest.  In the former substitution does not occur, while in the latter it does.  
The term assignment is used to indicate that the assignee will be substituted for 
the prior tenant while a subtenant will not.  The subtenant holds of the tenant 
who holds of the landlord.  So, the subtenant, or sublessee, is not substituted 
for the tenant in the relationship with the landlord.  Consequently, there is no 
privity between the subtenant and the landlord.  Each is in privity with the 
original tenant.  Thus, the landlord cannot enforce against the subtenant any 
obligation that requires privity, such as an obligation based on a promise. 
Whether a tenant’s transfer is an assignment or a sublease is a product of 
the parties’ intent.  There is a presumption that a transfer of the entire leasehold 
effects an assignment and that a transfer of only part of the leasehold effects 
only a sublease, but that presumption is rebuttable.  The casebooks generally 
make a point of the distinction between a sublease and an assignment.39 
IV.  THE STATUTE OF QUIA EMPTORES 
The Statute of Quia Emptores was enacted in England in 1290 to protect 
the incomes of the great lords and it is still considered part of the common law 
of almost every state of the United States.40  It was enacted because clever 
landowners had learned to use subinfeudation to avoid the burdens of the 
feudal obligations that were owed to those lords.  The statute provided: 
 
 38. See, e.g., BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 197-375; BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 341-482; CASNER & LEACH, supra note 1, at 377-556; CHASE, supra note 1, at 371-627; 
CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 1, at 409-522; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 419-546; 
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 248-416; KURTZ & HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 427-583; 
RABIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 27-161; SINGER, supra note 1, at 761-901. 
 39. See, e.g., BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 337-53; BURKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 402-30; 
CASNER & LEACH, supra note 1, at 527-56; CHASE, supra note 1, at 605-10; CRIBBET ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 510-22; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 470-71; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
27, at 465-84; JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 321-27; KURTZ & HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 
524-45; NELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 535-56 (1996); RABIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 117-39; 
SINGER, supra note 1, at 808-22. 
 40. Pennsylvania and South Carolina seem to be the only exceptions.  AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY § 1.41 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). 
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A STATUTE of our LORD THE KING, concerning the Selling and Buying of 
Land. 
FORASMUCH as Purchasers of Lands and Tenements of the Fees of great 
men and other Lords, have many times heretofore entered into their Fees, to 
the prejudice of the Lords, to whom the Freeholders of such great men have 
sold their Lands and Tenements to be holden in Fee of their Feoffors, and not 
of the Chief Lords of the Fees, whereby the same Chief Lords have many times 
lost their Escheats, Marriages, and Wardships of Lands and Tenements 
belonging to their Fees; which thing seemed very hard and extream unto those 
Lords and other great men, and moreover in this case manifest Disheritance: 
Our Lord the King, in his Parliament at Westminster after Easter, the 
eighteenth year of his Reign, that is to wit, in the Quinzime of Saint John 
Baptist, at the instance of the great Men of the Realm, granted, provided, and 
ordained, That from henceforth it shall be lawful to every Freeman to sell at his 
own pleasure his Lands and Tenements, or part of them; so that the Feoffee 
shall hold the same Lands or Tenements of the Chief Lord of the same Fee, by 
such Service and Customs as his Feoffor held before. 
 
AND if he sell any part of such Lands or Tenements to any, the Feoffee shall 
immediately hold it of the Chief Lord, and shall be forthwith charged with the 
Services, for so much as pertaineth, or ought to pertain to the said Chief Lord 
for the same parcel, according to the Quantity of the Land or Tenement so 
sold: And so in this case the same part of the Service shall remain to the Lord, 
to be taken by the hands of the Feofee, for the which he ought to be attendant 
and answerable to the same Chief Lord, according to the Quantity of the Land 
or Tenement sold, for the parcel of the Service so due.41 
The statute prohibited any further subinfeudation, except by the king, but it 
recognized a freeholder’s right to convey a fee title without having to first 
obtain the lord’s permission.  That is the point for which the statute is generally 
mentioned in modern property books, if it is mentioned at all.42  However, the 
statute also provided that the transferee of the fee, or any part of it, would 
thereafter hold that title subject to the same obligations that the transferor had 
previously owed to his lord.  In other words, the transferee would take the 
transferor’s place in the relationship that the transferor had with his lord.  The 
examples of substitution below go beyond the feudal obligations.  But they 
seem to follow the pattern set by the statute and expand its effect to satisfy 
evolving needs. 
 
 41. STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER THE THIRD (QUIA EMPTORES), 1290, c. 1, §§ 1-2. 
 42. See, e.g., BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 114; CASNER & LEACH, supra note 1, at 259-
60; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 194-95; KURTZ & HOVENCAMP, supra note 1, at 233-
34. 
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It may very well be that it was with covenants running with the land that 
the expansion of Quia Emptores first began.  In feudal times, the lord owed his 
tenant a duty of protection.  In fact, obtaining this protection was such a 
motivation that some free tenants who owned land allodially would seek out a 
prospective lord, convey their land to the lord only to have it conveyed back 
subject to a duty of service and the feudal incidents.  They had thereby taken 
on obligations.  But it was worthwhile because they had obtained the 
protection of a powerful lord who would now warrant and protect their land 
ownership.  The tenant’s successor, by conveyance or inheritance, would be 
entitled to the same protection because he was substituted for the tenant in the 
feudal relationship with the lord by the Statute of Quia Emptores.  When title 
warranties based upon covenant, rather than feudal relationships, evolved, the 
model of protection extending to successors in title continued to be used.  Thus 
the successor in title is substituted for the grantee regarding the benefits of the 
future title covenants found in a modern warranty deed. 
That model also fits with other real covenants that create an obligation that 
is analogous to the feudal obligations that the landowner owed to his lord.  
Such covenants would, by definition, touch and concern the land.  Of course, 
the creation of the covenant required satisfying the contract requirements of a 
promise that the parties intended to bind them and their successors.  Since the 
covenant involved land, the Statute of Frauds required a writing signed by the 
obligor.  Following the model of the Statute of Quia Emptores, the successor to 
the obligor in fee ownership would then be substituted for the original obligor.  
That would put him into privity with the other party to the covenant, called 
privity of estate to distinguish it from the privity of contract that arose between 
the original parties to the contract. 
Why should Quia Emptores be the basis for substitution regarding 
equitable claims or interests?  After all, Quia Emptores was a statute.  Statutes 
create law.  Why should this statute have any impact on equity?  Traditionally, 
equity operates by applying maxims, one of which is “equity follows the 
law.”43  Experience reveals that equity follows the law only until there is an 
equitable reason not to.  So substitution modeled on the mandate of the Statute 
of Quia Emptores should be the norm.  Substitution of the transferee causes the 
title to be subject to outstanding equities, such as equitable servitudes, 
equitable liens and rescission. 
Focus on the statute also explains why leases, easements and adverse 
possession of personal property were different. The Statute of Quia Emptores, 
by its express terms, applied only to fee estates.  Adverse possession of 
personal property did not even involve land, so it could not, by any stretch of 
the imagination, fit within the statute to make tacking occur.  Nor did the 
statute reach easements or leaseholds because they were not freeholds.  
 
 43. E.g., AM. JUR. 2D Equity §§ 113-14 (1996). 
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Reserving an easement by grant-re-grant would take advantage of the way the 
statute operated.  The conveyance of the fee would effect a substitution, but the 
re-grant of the easement would not.  These areas worked well outside the 
operation of the statute, and apparently there has been no pressure to stretch 
the statute to cover them. 
Quite the contrary, the very point of a lease was to avoid substitution.  
Consequently, a landowner can still subinfeudate, meaning, create an ongoing 
relationship based on what is still essentially a feudal relationship.  While the 
modern landlord-tenant relationship has certainly evolved, it is still basically a 
tenurial relationship as revealed by our choice of terms to identify these 
parties.  That explains the modern tension of rights and duties between the 
landlord and tenant. 
Because the statute does not apply to leases, it does not automatically 
produce substitution when a tenant transfers his lease.  Substitution will only 
occur if that is what the parties intend.  Where substitution does occur, we say 
the lease was assigned, rather than subleased because that indicates substitution 
did not occur. 
In a sublease, the transferee becomes the subtenant of the tenant who 
retains the ongoing lease relationship with the landlord.  Essentially, this 
situation would constitute subinfeudation rather than substitution,44 because a 
tenant who has transferred his entire leasehold generally has no reason to want 
to stay involved with his transferee, while a tenant who has a reversionary 
interest would want the power to protect the interest that being the landlord of 
his transferee might provide.  In the absence of an expression of intent, a 
presumption has evolved, but that is based on probable intent rather than the 
statute, meaning, if the tenant transfers its entire interest, there is substitution. 
Of course, the reason substitution still occurs is not because it is mandated 
by a statute passed in England over seven hundred years ago.  The statute 
merely provided a useful model for solving property problems, so it was used 
and even expanded.  If substitution had not been useful, it would have vanished 
long ago.  Whether the statute was the first appearance of automatic 
substitution is unknown, but clearly it was not the norm or there would have 
been no need for the statute.45  Identifying that model will help law students 
understand the workings of property law. 
 
 44. The distinction between substitution and subinfeudation is very similar to the distinction 
between assignment and subleasing in landlord-tenant law.  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, 
at 194 n.8. 
 45. Establishing with certainty that substitution began with the Statute of Quia Emptores is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  The author has found no evidence that substitution existed before 
the Statute but the author does not claim to be an historian.  However, the author is certainly 
curious about earlier examples of substitution.  If anyone has any leads to earlier examples of 
substitution, please contact the author at brownr@nsu.law.nova.edu. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
At most law schools today, the first course in Property lasts only one 
semester and it is as far in the real estate curriculum as many students ever get.  
Students should leave their Property course alert to the possibility that 
substitution occurs in real estate law and may occur in other areas, such as 
commercial law.  Some of the examples of substitution are covered in the 
books used for Property courses and probably most courses already cover some 
of those examples.  But students would find those examples easier to 
understand if they could see them in context as manifestations of a recurring 
phenomenon that is grounded in history.46  The more examples of the 
phenomenon covered, the more understandable substitution should be.  
Moreover, they should have a better understanding of how real estate law 
operates. 
 
 
 46. The time needed to draw the connection between the examples should be minimal.  The 
time needed to cover those examples not currently covered in the basic course, such as liens, 
shelter and lis pendens, should not be too great.  However, it is clear that adding anything to the 
course probably means that something else will get left out or minimized. 
